Pandora's Box - Bringing Science into Politics: The Debate on Scientific Integrity in U.S. Policymaking

bridges vol. 5, April 2005 / Feature Article
by Philipp Steger
 

"We are witnessing an assault on the basic principle that science should inform policy, not echo a political agenda," claimed Congressman Henry Waxman, a Democrat from California, before a group of science writers on February 14, 2005. Waxman's statement was made at the annual conference of the national association of science writers (NASW) and preceded an address given by John Marburger, science advisor to President George W. Bush [see article in this Bridges issue "John Marburger: A Practical Scientist Advising the President"]. In his speech, John Marburger did not refer at all to Waxman's unequivocal criticism of the administration.

A few hours later, Waxman, whose congressional district includes communities like Santa Monica, Malibu, Beverly Hills, and West Hollywood and is one of the country's more liberal districts, and his colleague Bart Gordon, the ranking Democrat on the House Science Committee, introduced a bill entitled "Restore Scientific Integrity to Federal Research and Policymaking Act." Waxman, not one known to mince words, accompanied the introduction of the proposed legislation with yet another harsh indictment of the administration: "From abstinence education to the protection of endangered whales, the Bush Administration has twisted and distorted science to further a narrow political agenda. We need to act now to protect the scientific integrity of federal agencies."

Both Henry Waxman's vigorous attack and the way John Marburger disregarded it, fit in with a pattern that has come to dominate the debate on scientific integrity in policy-making in the US: harsh and sweeping indictments made by self-proclaimed defenders of science on one side, and only muted reactions - if any at all - by those accused of a broad range of crimes against science. The Waxman-Gordon Bill is only the latest installment in what has become a protracted feud between parts of the scientific community and the Bush administration.

A brief history of the feud
Early on in President Bush's first term, there had been some grumbling from those within the scientific community who in one way or the other were involved in providing scientific advice to the federal government in its policymaking. In July 2003, "Republicans for Environmental Protection" (REP), a national grassroots organization, published a statement saying that the "withholding of environmental information was getting to be a bad habit with the Bush administration." And here and there in editorials published in scientific journals, various experts voiced their concern over a growing politicization of science. One particularly adamant editorial by Donald Kennedy was published in January 2003 in Science Magazine. In it, Kennedy criticized the politicization of scientific advisory committees and quoted cases where candidates for positions on such committees had been asked whether they had voted for the President.
 
All of this did not escape the attention of Henry Waxman, who often points out that his proudest legislative accomplishments have all resulted from collaboration with the scientific community. Waxman, the ranking minority member of the House Committee on Government Reform, decided to pursue the rumors and allegations and asked the committee's Democratic staff to investigate the matter. The result of the investigation, a report titled "Politics and Science in the Bush Administration," was released in August 2003. The report came to the conclusion that the Bush Administration had "repeatedly suppressed, distorted, or obstructed science to suit political and ideological goals" and it alleged that these actions went "far beyond the traditional influence that Presidents are permitted to wield at federal agencies and compromise the integrity of scientific policymaking." As examples, supporting this drastic conclusion, the 32-page report documented cases in a number of areas ranging from abstinence education "where performance measures were changed to make unproven 'abstinence-only' programs appear effective," to global warming "where reports by the Environmental Protection Agency on the risks of climate change were suppressed," and to wetlands policy "where comments from scientists at the Fish and Wildlife Service on the destructive impacts of proposed regulatory changes were withheld."

The report, henceforth known as the Waxman report, generated considerable media attention, but - given Waxman's reputation as a fierce critic of the Bush administration on a number of other issues - was easily dismissed by the administration as motivated by partisan politics. The Washington Post quoted Adam Levine, replying for the White House, as saying: "I'm hard pressed to believe anyone would consider Congressman Waxman an objective arbiter of scientific fact."

Less than a year later, in February of 2004, an independent not-for profit association, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) [see article in this bridges issue "Union of Concerned Scientists"], published a report on the issue of scientific integrity in policymaking, which it subtitled "An investigation into the Bush Administration's Misuse of Science."

The document, produced by the 100,000 member organization, contained a host of allegations of misuse of science in federal policymaking. The claims covered a wide terrain: from allegations that scientific findings not in-line with the administration's political agenda had been censored, that agencies had interfered with research and suppressed unpopular research, to the accusation that agencies across the administration placed people on scientific advisory committees only after they had passed a political litmus test. In essence, the UCS report accused the administration of suppressing, censoring, and distorting scientific findings and manipulating scientific advisory bodies, and of doing all of the aforementioned on an unprecedented scale. "There is significant evidence that the scope and scale of the manipulation, suppression, and misrepresentation of science by the Bush administration are unprecedented," says one of the report's conclusions.

 

Although there are obvious overlaps between this document and the earlier Waxman report, UCS says it wasn't the Waxman report that had impelled its action. "We had kept a close watch on this issue for some time when the Waxman report came out, because we were getting increasingly concerned about this. After all, a lot of it was known widely and some of it was well publicized," explained Kurt Gottfried, emeritus professor of physics at Cornell University and Chairman of the Union of Concerned Scientists, in an interview for bridges. [Kurt Gottfried / photo credit: Cornell University]

The report was published together with a statement accusing the administration of "misrepresenting and suppressing scientific knowledge" and of having "undermined the quality and independence of the scientific advisory system and the morale of the government's outstanding scientific personnel." The statement, which called on the administration to cease "the distortion of scientific knowledge for partisan political ends," was signed by 60 scientists, including many Nobel Laureates.
 
The UCS report marked an important turning point: what had only been simmering until then under the threshold of public attention, now turned into a debate that was hard to ignore. "The first UCS report framed this debate. Because of the timing and who it came from, the UCS report received more attention," says David Goldston, the majority staff director at the House Science Committee, in an interview for bridges [see article in this bridges issue "David Goldston - A Practiced Hand Running The House Science Committeee"]. "Although most people would view UCS as having an ideological, if not necessarily a partisan, alignment, it still mattered more than the Waxman report, because it came from outside the political structure." Presidential science advisor John Marburger points to another factor, the large number of some of the country's more famous scientists to have signed the accompanying statement: "It was the scientists' credibility that gave the report its weight. And that created a dynamic that was very difficult to ignore," says Marburger. [John Marburger / photo credit: OSTP]

The onus of defending the administration fell to the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), which - as part of the Executive Office of the President - has the task of overseeing and coordinating science policy across the federal government. The immediate reaction, a statement in which John Marburger dismissed the criticism as "sweeping generalizations about the Administration based on what appears to be a miscellany of criticisms, many of which have been made in the past by partisan political figures and advocacy organizations," outlined what would essentially remain the core of the administration's response.

There might not, however, have been a more comprehensive response to the allegations, had the release of the UCS report not coincided with congressional hearings on the science budget proposals in the President's FY 2005 budget. John Marburger explains that the appropriators asked OSTP to provide a response to the claims made in the UCS report. OSTP did as asked and in April 2004 published a "Response to the Union of Concerned Scientists' February 2004 Document." The response acknowledged some of the facts, but disagreed on the details and on the interpretation of the cases and called the overwhelming majority of allegations and claims made in the UCS report either "wrong," "not true," "false," or a distortion of the facts. And again, as in the earlier statement, the administration pointed out that the cases didn't warrant speaking of a pattern of systematic abuse of science by the administration. "My purpose in writing the report was not so much in refuting the criticism as in disclosing that there is a whole lot of additional information that would suggest that the report itself had not been very careful and objective in its composition," explains John Marburger in an interview for bridges.

The response didn't allay the critics' concerns, and it is unclear whether OSTP was really ever in a position to do so. Neal Lane, John Marburger's predecessor in the Clinton administration, says that he didn't find the response by OSTP very insightful but wasn't surprised by that: "I know how the place works. The response had to be signed off on by all the agencies involved, thus all the political people in these agencies had to be comfortable with Jack Marburger's response." And David Goldston, who is generally satisfied with how OSTP has handled the issue, explains: "There is only so much OSTP can do. It is a small White House office with a relatively small staff, which is nothing unique to this administration. It has general oversight but is not in charge of day-to-day management. It has to focus on large, cross agency issues and give general guidance. But it would be unrealistic to expect OSTP under any administration to second-guess every administrative decision of every agency."

 

So no one seemed particularly surprised when, indeed, the response failed to abate the criticism. To the contrary, the criticism intensified as UCS forged ahead and, a few months later, published an addition to the original report containing further alleged cases of abuse of science within the executive branch. And earlier this year, UCS together with Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER) followed up with a survey of scientists working for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), which came to the conclusion that "political intervention to alter scientific results [had] become pervasive" within USFWS.

So far, Congress has largely eschewed the debate. Even moderate Republicans like the House Science Committee's chairman Sherwood Boehlert, whom Neal Lane, Bill Clinton's science advisor, calls a "friend of science and the environment," have shied away from taking an active role in the debate.  "In this very polarized debate, Mr. Boehlert has taken the intelligent middle ground, which is in the best interest of the scientific community," argues David Goldston. "Some of the debate has been useful to have to highlight areas where there may have been issues," says Goldston. Asked whether that means that the House Science Committee is likely to hold hearings on some of the allegations, Goldston replies that most of the research and activities wouldn't necessarily happen on a public level. [David Goldston / photo credit: OST]

The only noticeable public reaction to the criticism by Congress was the recent introduction of the Waxman-Gordon bill, which puts Democrats in the House on the side of the critics. In an interview for bridges, Chuck Atkins, director of the Democratic staff on the House Science Committee, offers an explanation for the lack of activity by the House Science Committee beyond the introduction of the Waxman-Gordon bill: "Had the House been under Democratic control, we would certainly have had hearings and official committee deliberations on the issue when it arose. We did carry out some unofficial hearings on the matter, but as the minority we can't start a formal investigation."

It appears that, in the absence of public hearings, the UCS report served as a main source for the proposed legislation. Says Atkins: "The UCS report provided another source of information outside of Congress that verified and gave some evidence to some of the conclusions in the Waxman report. I see it as a third party verifier of some of the earlier conclusions that there is a problem in some respect. I have heard it said by the Republicans that UCS is basically a more liberal group. But I have looked at the credentials of some of the players at UCS and they are impeccable - no matter what their political leanings might be, there is a lot of credibility for their conclusions." [Chuck Atkins / photo credit: private]
 
The influence of the UCS report on the legislation is hard to miss. In its findings, H.R. 839, as the bill is formally called, reiterates much of the earlier criticism: "Over the past four years, leading scientific associations and scientific journals, Inspectors General, senior scientists within the Federal Government, former scientific officials from both Republican and Democratic administrations, and 48 Nobel Laureates have raised concerns about political interference with science in the executive branch of the Federal Government." The findings continue "this interference has included tampering with the conduct of research, gagging of government scientists, distortion of scientific information presented to Congress and the public, and manipulation of Federal scientific advisory committees."

The way the bill would go about "restoring scientific integrity in federal research and policymaking" is first by outlawing a number of activities that lead to political interference with science, i.e. "tampering with the conduct of Federally funded scientific research or analysis," "censorship of findings," and "directing the dissemination of scientific information," which is known to be false or misleading. In order to ensure that cases of interference with science are reported, the act would extend whistleblower protections to federal employees who expose scientific manipulations. And, in an attempt to eliminate undue political influence, agencies using scientific advisory committees would be required to designate individuals working on a committee as either a "special government employee" or a "representative." The difference between the two? A special government employee would essentially be someone who is an expert and who, in providing his or her expertise, works for the government, whereas a "representative" would not necessarily have an expert background and would clearly represent the views of individuals or entities outside the Federal Government. While the first group would be expected to give unbiased expert advice, the second group would be known for their biased advice. An agency intending to appoint someone who falls in the second category, would need to consult with the agency's ethics official. While it's hard to imagine how this rule would work in real life, another measure in the proposed act, requiring substantial disclosure of all information regarding scientific policymaking within an agency, seems more likely to create the sort of transparency that would cut short any attempts at undermining scientific integrity.
 
Signing on to this bill and its proposed measures would amount to saying that there is, indeed, a systemic problem across the administration. Little wonder, therefore, that David Goldston does not expect the bill to gather much momentum. "I haven't seen an issue where there is the kind of systemic problem that would lend itself to a legislative fix," says Goldston. And his counterpart on the Democratic side confirms: "This issue is not on the front burner of the House Science Committee."

All of that doesn't seem to faze UCS, which - according to Kurt Gottfried - will publish yet another report in the near future.

A debate at an impasse
The persistence of the criticism, the continuous emergence of new cases, the introduction of legislation to "restore scientific integrity," a growing consensus within the most vocal parts of the scientific community that the administration is misusing science, and some prominent Republicans joining the chorus of critical voices, all make it likely that this issue will continue to pursue the administration throughout the President's second term. "I expect the concept of a conspiracy to undermine science's integrity in the Bush administration - whether right or wrong - to persist," says John Marburger.

Critics of the administration would argue that debate's momentum and the continued support the criticism draws from within the scientific community - more than 6,000 scientists, among them 48 Nobel Laureates, have so far signed UCS's February 2004 statement - underscore the validity of the criticism. Arden L. Bement, director of the National Science Foundation (NSF), doubts whether the signers are representative of the scientific community, though: "While there were, indeed, some very high visibility members of the scientific community who came together and raised that criticism just before the election, I question whether any such group can speak for the whole community with one voice. The community is much more diverse than that. There weren't a lot of engineers in that particular group, for example." Bement, who headed the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) before coming to NSF, also says that he hasn't had any experiences that would relate to the criticism: "There has been no case I can cite where the administration has come in to either NIST or NSF with a heavy hand."

The persistence of the debate and the publicity it has received is also a result of how the debate was framed. From very early on, the debate focused not so much on the validity of the individual allegations, as on the overarching claim that the number of cases justifies speaking of a pattern of abuse of science in the administration's policymaking. This has created an obvious impasse, because such a claim is as hard to refute as it is to prove, unless both sides sit down, agree on a methodology, and spend considerable time and effort at conducting a study that lives up to their agreed-upon methodology and the rigors of scientific inquiry.

In this situation, the critics find themselves in the more advantageous position: they have the prima facie evidence in their support: no matter how many claims the administration sets out to refute, a question like why, if the allegations aren't true, so many accomplished scientists have signed the UCS statement or why the criticism doesn't abate, will stop the best-intentioned efforts at refutation in their track.

The way representatives of the administration explain their reaction to the criticism and the way critics view the administration's response clearly show that. Looking back at OSTP's response to UCS's allegations, John Marburger explains: "I did look into every case and I did not find either a pattern of abuse or even very serious cases. I found a few cases of poor judgment where people in agencies did things that ranged from undiplomatic to 'not smart.' But I didn't see any reason to apologize for these things or even suggest that there was something wrong. For me to send even the slightest suggestion that there might be something wrong and that I am going to 'investigate' would have been a mistake in the charged political atmosphere of the time. Significance would have been attached to such a statement that would not be correct. I very deliberately avoided giving any suggestion that there was something wrong or needing to be investigated." Although Kurt Gottfried of UCS finds some merit in the fact that there was a reponse - "the response by Marburger was the only instance the administration was actually taking time to say that what we are saying was wrong. Now, it seems they have given up on even that." - he dismisses its content: "What the administration is basically saying is that the top level of the American print press - the New York Times, the LA Times, the Washington Post, even the Wall Street Journal - are incompetent. Because almost everything we documented had first been reported on, in less detail, in these newspapers. There has never been this level of top scientists across the entire spectrum - from Astronomy to Zoology - voicing their concern about this issue as now, and to treat them as ill-informed people who don't know the score is patently ridiculous." Even Neal Lane, who believes that there is plenty of evidence of the good work of OSTP and John Marburger in general, is not impressed by the administration's response so far: "I stand by what we have said, namely, that we have never seen a time - in our lifetime at least - where either party in control of the White House has dealt with science so carelessly and, in my view, irresponsibly as this administration has done in some areas."
 
John Marburger seems to acknowledge that there is only so much OSTP can accomplish in the face of the overarching allegation, but he says that neither the intensity of the criticism nor the increased credibility imparted by the outstanding scientists who aligned with it make the claim of a pattern of abuse of science across the administration any more substantiated. Marburger argues that already the Waxman report "basically promulgated a conspiracy theory that swept a lot of separate cases into one bag." This, in Marburger's view, coincided with the dissatisfaction about the change in administration. "All of this created an environment in which some of these ideas put forth in these reports - with their special flavor of sweeping everything into a conspiracy theory - resonated with people's feelings. The overlap between the UCS document and the Waxman report is an example of that. The two documents resemble each other in many aspects, in particular in their approach and the theory they subscribe to: the idea of a conspiracy to undermine the integrity of science. This idea emerged in the political context following a bitterly fought and highly polarizing presidential campaign, a campaign in which the new tools of the Internet were used aggressively to undermine the credibility of the candidates."

John Marburger is not alone in accusing the critics of promulgating conspiracy theories. David Goldston speaks of an "unsubstantiated claim that there is a conspiracy of folks who want to politicize science." But the critics insist that that's an unintended consequence: "Nobody is saying there's a conspiracy in the sense that there is someone in the White House telling some political appointee at an agency to do this or that. But it doesn't take a fancy political theorist to realize that this administration has systematically put political appointees in various places who all come with particular, quite well-defined ideologies, one of which is to reverse regulations as much as possible, which is clearly what's happening with EPA; another common objective is to do what one can to please the religious constituency, which is what you see happening at CDC and NIH," says Kurt Gottfried of UCS.

So far, the debate has come to this: the administration expects that the idea of the Bush administration misusing science will not disappear anytime soon. And Kurt Gottfried, on the other side of the fence, harbors no illusions about tangible outcomes of the critics' efforts: "I doubt that we'll accomplish many tangible results with this administration, but by doing what we do, we create awareness in the scientific community and with the media."
Barry D. Gold, a former staffer at the House Science Committee who is now in charge of science-based conservation programs at the David & Lucile Packard foundation, sums it up well when he says: "Unfortunately, the issue of politicization of science, itself, got politicized." [Barry D. Gold / photo credit: private]

So where does this leave science?

Important issues eclipsed by a politicized debate
It is unlikely that the debate's politicization will be helpful for science. One reason is that it has reduced the likelihood that Congress will come up with any meaningful responses to the issue. Of even more importance: the debate has eclipsed a crucial issue, namely whether there really is a consensus on the appropriate role of science in policymaking.

The debate, by focusing nearly exclusively on the question of whether or not there is a pattern of misuse of science across the administration, has created the impression that a consensus exists on the role science should play in policymaking. The administration's belief that the final decision is the prerogative of the policymaker is shared by its critics. Take Neal Lane, for instance, who is an outspoken critic of the administration's handling of scientific integrity. He, too, agrees that it's the politician's prerogative to make the final call, even if it happens to be contrary to what the scientific information would indicate: "In the end, the policy decision will take into account many different factors besides the scientific ones. That's how it should be and how it has always been." Or take Chuck Atkins, the Democratic staff director at the House Science Committee and longtime Chief of Staff for Representative Bart Gordon, who argues along the same lines: "It's clearly not the role of scientists to make the policy decisions. Just because there is a scientific set of facts that should be considered in making policy, that doesn't mean it makes the policy."

The critics are able to make their statements so confidently, without fearing that they will undermine their case, because they implicitly attribute more relevance and objectivity to scientific arguments than to other arguments, and feel that in most of the cited cases the science clearly indicated what the appropriate action was. Both the administration and the critics are using the same textbook model of how science in policymaking works. This model goes something like this: a policymaker, having to decide on a course of action, carefully weighs the various alternatives and the available information on each of them. If part of the information on the various alternatives and their consequences is of a scientific nature, then in most cases the science will clearly and objectively indicate what the appropriate action is.

Apart from the fact that in reality decision-makers rarely are the wise, unbiased, and entirely objective people textbooks would have them be, this model fails to consider the real-world phenomenon of "an excess of objectivity." "Excess of objectivity" is a term coined by Dan Sarewitz, professor of science and society at Arizona State University (ASU), who, in an interview for bridges, claims that "there is plenty of science to go around. You don't really need to distort the science. All you need to do in many cases is find the right science. That is not an indictment of science or scientists, but a statement about the complexity of reality and nature and the difficulty of defining problems in very narrow ways."
 
Sarewitz's statement suggests that the assumed consensus on whether science can objectively indicate the "right" course of action is an illusion. "The scientific finding never tells you what to do. That is always determined by what you are trying to achieve; and what you are trying to achieve is always guided by values and interests. So there is no formula that takes you from a fact to an action," says Sarewitz, who is also the director of the Consortium for Science, Policy, and Outcomes (CSPO) at ASU. Of course, Sarewitz's belief runs contrary to what is, if not the consensus, definitely the currently predominant view, namely that science does, indeed, indicate which action is appropriate.

Says former science advisor Neal Lane: "We expect an agency to say what the scientific information on an issue is and to specify why they have taken a decision that's contrary to the science." This widespread expectation, while not demanding that the decision has to be in line with the science, does place scientific arguments on a level above other arguments in the policymaking process. The expectation that decisionmakers should explain a decision perceived as contrary to the science puts the decisionmakers in a situation where they can reasonably respond only by taking recourse to some other scientific information that supports their point of view which, according to Sarewitz's "excess of objectivity"-argument shouldn't be too difficult. The decisionmakers who decide to do otherwise and instead admit that the science is not in alignment with their ideological agenda, open themselves up to attacks of disregarding the science for the simple fact that they did not respond with an opposing set of scientific facts.

All of this doesn't offer any new insights about the political process or about the politicization of science. It does reveal, however, the currently predominant view of science. "Politics is all about adjudicating value disputes. Yet everybody is looking for some advantage that would exempt them from having to resort to values and instead allow them to use 'objective facts' and 'objective statements about the world,' and we privilege these statements above mere assertions of values, although it's the values that are motivating the dispute," says Sarewitz.

This is precisely what the debate has so far eclipsed: the general trend to use science in political discussions with the expectation that it will somehow objectify and validate a political argument. "The debate has reinforced the damaging view that political controversy can be resolved by research, partially because the debate plays on the questionable assumption that if a scientific expert says something it has unimpeachable authority," says Sarewitz.

Says David Goldston: "Increasingly, participants in the political debate want to bring science in on their side. They view science as one of the last areas of human endeavor, which the public considers to be unbiased, objective, and beyond reproach. So everybody wants to wrap his or her arguments in the aura of science." As understandable and human as the wish to validate one's arguments with science may be, it certainly doesn't make political debates any more objective. The baffling debate on the teaching of creationism vs. evolutionism vs. intelligent design may serve as a case in point.

What the critics of the Bush Administration's handling of science in policymaking are saying in essence is that the credibility of science is being misused to further a political agenda. And the administration is responding by saying that it's not abusing the credibility of science. Hardly anyone seems to wonder whether the tendency to give a priori credibility to science simply because it comes under the cloak of Science may be part of the problem.
***

Philipp Steger is Attaché for Science and Technology and director of the Office of Science & Technology at the Embassy of Austria in Washington, DC.
 

The above article was prepared based on the sources below and on individual interviews conducted with the following persons:
o Earnest Charles (Chuck) Atkins, Chief of Staff (105th Congress), Office of Congressman Bart Gordon and Chief of Democratic Staff, House Science Committee. Interview conducted on March 18, 2005.

o Arden L. Bement, Director, National Science Foundation. Interview conducted on March 6, 2005.

o Barry D. Gold, Program Officer, The David and Lucile Packard Foundation. Interview conducted on March 31, 2005.

o David J. Goldston, Chief of Staff for the House Science Committee, U.S. House of Representatives. Interview conducted on April 4, 2005.

o Kurt Gottfried, Co-founder and Chair, Union of Concerned Scientists. Interview conducted on April 5, 2005.

o Neal Lane, University Professor, Dept. of Physics and Astronomy, Rice University. Interview conducted on April 6, 2005.

o John H. Marburger III, Science Advisor to the President, Director Office of Science & Technology Policy, The White House. Interview conducted on March 24, 2005.

o Daniel Sarewitz, Managing Director and Adjunct Assistant Professor School of International and Public Affair, Center for Science, Policy & Outcomes, Columbia University. Interview conducted on April 6, 2005.


Sources
o Congressman Sherwood Boehlert's Website - http://www.house.gov/boehlert/

o Congressman Bart Gordon's Website - http://gordon.house.gov/hor/tn06/home.htm

o Congressman Henry Waxman's Website - http://www.waxman.house.gov/

o Consortium for Science, Policy & Outcomes at Arizona State University - http://www.cspo.org/

o House Science Committee - http://www.house.gov/science/welcome.htm

o National Academies Press - http://www.nap.edu/
  • Implementing Climate and Global Change Research: A Review of the Final U.S. Climate Change Science Program Strategic Plan, Committee to Review the U.S. Climate Change Science Program Strategic Plan, National Research Council, 2004 - http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10635.html

o National Science Writers Association - http://nasw.org/

o Office of Science & Technology Policy - http://www.ostp.gov
  • A conversation with John Marburger: "Policy, Politics, and Science in the White House: Conversations with Presidential Science Advisors, University of colorado at Boulder, February 2004 - http://www.ostp.gov/html/jhmUCBoulder.pdf

o Republicans for Environmental Protection (REP) - http://www.rep.org

o Rice University - http://www.rice.edu/

o Scienceinpolicy.org, a website focusing on science in environmental policymaking - http://www.scienceinpolicy.org

o Union of Concerned Scientists - http://www.ucsusa.org/

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